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BOOK REVIEWS

Platonische Aufsätze. Von OTTO APELT. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.
Pp. v+296. M. 8.

These lucid and interesting studies occupy for the most part a middle ground between the merely literary essay and the philological investigation. There are few footnotes, there is no critical apparatus, and little polemic or explicit reference to the views of other scholars. The author gives his interpretation in the form of continuous exposition, largely interwoven with well selected passages translated from Plato. Without any pretense of system, the first ten essays give a very fair and readable account of Plato's method, his metaphysics, his ethics and politics—of nearly everything except his relation to the life and thought of his time and his philosophy of nature and aesthetics.

Especially valuable are the admirable summary of the political ideas of the *Laws* and *Politicus* in comparison with the *Republic* in the essay on "Die Aufgabe des Staatsmannes," and the four ethical essays "Das Prinzip der platonischen Ethik," "Die Lehre von der Lust," "Der Wert des Lebens" (against the conception of Plato as a pessimistic ascetic), and "Straftheorie" (an intelligent analysis and criticism of Plato's doctrine of punishment). Professor Apelt rightly rejects the view that the famous *ἁμολίωσις τῷ θεῷ* is the principle of the Platonic ethics. It is at most the religious formulation of the principle. The Platonic ethic is autonomous. But I cannot concur in the further statement that its principle is "the concept of the beautiful with its direct correlate, the concept of measure." That too is formula and Greek commonplace. The underlying philosophic principle, as I have elsewhere shown (*The Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 23–24), is the negativity of (sensuous) pleasure, of which Professor Apelt says too little. And the chief motive of the literary exposition of the ethics in the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Laws*, is that challenge of ethical nihilism which modern ethical writers, except Nietzsche, evade and which Professor Apelt seems to overlook.

The two essays on Method—that on Plato's humor and that on "Die Taktik des platonischen Sokrates," are perhaps the most original portions of the book. Together with a few fanciful suggestions, they present a quantity of true and delicate observations which no student or critic of Plato can afford to neglect. Three essays deal with Plato's metaphysical philosophy as a whole: "Der überhimmlische Ort," "Wahrheit," and "Disharmonien." Here we cannot expect agreement. The critic of Plato's philosophy must possess a philosophy of his own which will endure the tests that he applies

to Plato's. He must know how to allow for Plato's dramatic form, humor, irony, special literary motives, and polemical intentions. He must above all have decided whether Plato is to be treated as a mature thinker, the equal of modern philosophers, or as a genius of the early world, for whose inevitable errors the superior modern makes condescending allowance. I do not accept Kantianism as a standard for the measure of all philosophies, nor admit that it does away with any surds left unresolved by Plato. I do not believe that we need to make allowance for the imperfect development of abstraction in Plato's day in order to do justice to the doctrine of ideas. So far from holding Plato's error to lie in the hypostatization of *all* concepts, I admire him most for seeing that it must be all or none, whether we treat the theory as a logical method or a substantive metaphysical doctrine. I find few if any contradictions or inconsistencies in Plato that need any further explanation than his conscious literary and religious intentions or the inherent insolubility of the problem. I have repeatedly proved that the Idea of Good is not God, but that it is a regulative concept still indispensable to ethical and political philosophy. From these presuppositions Professor Apelt could easily deduce my points of dissent. To set them forth again here would be to write a treatise, not a review. It should be said, however, that this book is generally free from those perversions or misapprehensions of Platonic texts that usually accompany attempts to work out a rigid system for Plato and schoolmaster him for all deviations from it. Without going so far as I do, Professor Apelt emphasizes what I have called the unity of Plato's thought, in refreshing contrast to prevailing theories of his changing phases and evolutions.

The eleventh and twelfth essays are special studies, and really constitute a sort of appendix. That on "Die beiden Hippias" maintains the genuineness of both dialogues. The *Hippias Maior* for which explicit Aristotelian testimony is lacking, is, Apelt thinks, in content an indispensable supplement to the unsatisfactory and apparently immoral conclusion of the *Hippias Minor*. The science of the *Καλόν* is required to determine the right use of the indeterminate and therefore amoral faculty (*δύναμις*) which in the lesser dialogue gave rise to the playful paradox that the man who can both lie and tell the truth is "better" than he who cannot tell a lie. This is doubtless a conceivable, but perhaps fanciful connection. It is enough that, as Professor Apelt argues, there is little if anything un-Platonic in the greater *Hippias*, and the burden of proof rests upon its impugnors. The parallel (p. 236) between *Hippias Minor* 375D and Aristotle's *Ethics* had been already pointed out in my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic* (p. 209). The proposed emendation of *σώματα* to *σχήματα* in *Hippias Maior* 301B *διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῇ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκῶτα* is unnecessary. It is not requisite that the allusion in 301E should repeat every point in 301B, and the text is, I think, sufficiently defended by *Sophist* 246B, where ingenious dialecticians break up in their arguments the bodies

that constitute reality for the materialists: τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. But it must be admitted that the whole *Hippias* passage, in its somewhat technical phrasing, presents a difficulty on the theory that the dialogue is both genuine and early.

The long critical discussion of the *Sophist* which concludes the volume is too technical for detailed examination in my space. I merely note two or three points: (1) The introductory analysis of the *Sophist* is admirably clear and sound. (2) The general view of the logical value and purpose of the *Sophist* is, I think, essentially that presented in my dissertation on the Platonic ideas and in my *Unity of Plato's Thought*. (3) The criticism of Plato's treatment of the negative and of negative predication is (in substance) that of Mill and Grote. It is unfair to Plato and is due to our habit of thinking in modern idiom instead of in Greek idiom and in the terms of Plato's problem (see *Unity*, p. 54). To this Apelt adds the further complication of identifying Aristotle's indeterminate propositions ἀδιόριστοι with what modern German logicians call "Begriffsvergleichung" in contradiction to real "Urteil." Plato's propositions about the identity or difference of "rest," "motion," "being," the "same," and the "other," are undoubtedly "Begriffsvergleichungen," if we choose to adopt that terminology. But Plato, though he has not the terminology, is aware of the fact. He knows that he is comparing concepts, and in comparing them he is consciously and correctly taking the terms of his propositions universally, though he is not pedantically careful to use πᾶς. There is nothing indeterminate in his propositions. He is raising the real question: are any two or more of these concepts identical throughout their whole extent? that is, are they merely synonyms for the same thing? Aristotle's ἀδιόριστοι have nothing to do with this. They are careless or eristic unquantified propositions which must be quantified before the argument can proceed. It is a mere accident that such propositions would usually be in fact "Begriffsvergleichungen." Aristotle, as his example ἡδονή indicates, is perhaps thinking of the first sentences of the *Philebus* (see my note in *Class. Phil.* III, 344), or of such Platonic passages as *Gorgias* 495A, 499B, *Hippias major* 287D, 293E, 297C.

Plato undoubtedly associates the negative with either subject or predicate and not with the copula. This seems unnatural to us and obscures the true function of the negative. But this was precisely the Greek idiom that was the chief cause of the problem. We cannot even translate into modern speech such expressions as τὸ μὴ ὄν, τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, etc., or ἡ μὴ μπειρία. It is true that Plato never formulated, as Aristotle did, the rules for the conversion of propositions, and the distinction of contradictory and contrary opposition. But he is clearly aware of the distinction and never erred through overlooking it. *Protagoras* 350BC is intentional, as I have repeatedly shown (e.g., *Class. Phil.* I, 297). *Republic* 437AB, cited by Apelt, does not

prove the point. There, after opposing as *ἐναντία* the contraries *ἐπινεύειν ἀνανεύειν*, etc., Plato further illustrates the two opposed categories by *ἐπιθυμῶν, ἐθέλειν, βούλεσθαι*, on the one hand, and *ἀβουλεῖν, μὴ ἐθέλειν, μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν*, on the other. This, Apelt says, is in itself enough to prove that Plato supposed contrary opposition to include contradictory. I reply: (1) the technical distinction is not in question in this psychological passage and Plato was as free to speak of opposites or incompatibles, in the broad sense, as we are. Plato, as his treatment of Prodicus shows, made distinctions only when he needed them. He does not need to distinguish contrary and contradictory propositions here. Neither contraries nor contradictories can be true "of the same thing at the same time in the same relation," etc. (2) *μὴ ἐθέλειν* is only in grammatical form the contradictory of *ἐθέλειν*. It means "to be unwilling," and if we take it so the purely technical inaccuracy disappears. Plato probably coined *ἀβουλεῖν*, perhaps to avoid *μὴ βούλεσθαι*, as Tarde uses *nolonté* for the "opposite" of *volonté*. There was no good single synonym for *μὴ ἐθέλειν*, and *μὴ ἐθέλειν* drew after it *μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν*. In any case, the opposition of propositions is not involved at all. Plato is merely piling up synonyms to illustrate a real psychological opposition, and the scrutiny that finds in his words a confusion of contrary and contradictory could find it equally in any modern writer. Thus once more is verified the presumption (I have never said that it is a certainty) that the "mistakes" of Plato are usually the misapprehensions of his interpreters.

PAUL SHOREY

Sprachliche Forschungen zur Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge. Von HANS v. ARNIM. Vienna: Hölder, 1912. Pp. 235.

Professor von Arnim believes that the distrust of *Sprachstatistik* still expressed in certain quarters is partly justified by the inadequacy of past presentations of the method, including his own. It is not enough to establish stylistic coincidences between a group of dialogues suspected to belong to the same period. We must know negatively that there do not exist other coincidences that might associate the group with an altogether different set of dialogues. The practitioner of the method cannot shift this burden upon his opponents. He must himself compare every dialogue with every other dialogue—*ἢ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ ἔργον*.

To undertake this for every trait of style would demand more than "die entsagungsvolle Arbeit vieler Menschenleben." Meanwhile, it is possible to select certain specially significant linguistic phenomena, the exhaustive study of which will practically suffice. For this purpose, Professor von Arnim has chosen the forms or formulae of assent in the dialogues. He has made complete collections of these and some allied expressions, but confines himself in